Si Vis Pacem, Para Bellum
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
Saturday, July 28, 2007
Thursday, April 19, 2007
Holding out for a Hero
Friday, March 09, 2007
4 Jobs, die du in deinem Leben gerne getan hättest
Fleet Admiral, US Navy
Commander, Israel Air Force
First Sea Lord/Commander of the Royal Navy (1SL/CRN)
Lead Guitarist, Red Hot Chili Peppers
4 Filme, die du immer wieder anschauen kannst
Au Revoir, les Enfants
The Living Daylights (007)
4 Städte in denen du gerne gelebt hättest
Santiago de Chile
4 Plätze, in denen du im Urlaub warst
Umm Rash Rash (Eilat)
Kyoto (die Stadt kann nichts fuer das Protokoll)
4 Webseiten, die du täglich besuchst
Statler & Waldorf
Little Green Footballs
4 deiner Lieblingsessen
1 Flasche Penfolds Bin 23 mit 200g Grana Padano
1 Eimer Ben & Jerry's
1 T-Bone Steak
1 Blanton's Single Barrel Bourbon on the Rocks
4 Plätze wo du gerade gern wärst
In einer B-2 über Isfahan (morgen früh)
In einer B-1B über Natanz (morgen früh)
In einer Mirage III CJ über el-Arish (5. Juni 1967, 7:15am)
In einem Gallardo Spyder in den Seealpen oberhalb von Menton
4 TV-Serien, die du gerne anschaust
CSI Las Vegas
The Wall Street Journal Editorial Report (Fox News)
Vier Bücher, die du immer wieder lesen kannst
Mark Helprin, A Soldier of the Great War
Vikram Seth, An Equal Music
Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War
Henryk Modest Broder, Der Ewige Antisemit
Vier CDs, die du immer wieder hören kannst
U2, The Joshua Tree
Dire Straits, Alchemy Live
Bright Eyes, Motion Sickness
Ryan Adams, Cold Roses
4 Blogger, denen du das Stöckchen weitergibst
Statler & Waldorf
Wednesday, October 11, 2006
Thinking back on this year's War
I make no secret of my appreciation of and downright affection for Mark Helprin, and not just because he happens to be my favorite novelist. His understanding of complex geopolitical issues is also second to none, as he makes clear in the definitive account of Israel's war on Hizb'allah of this past summer, available courtesy of the irreplaceable Claremont Institute.
First, some good news for civilized nations, in the form of bad news for the 'Palestinians':
For example, the war has been a strong argument for continued Israeli control of the Jordan crossings and the sea and air approaches to a Palestinian state, lest Qassems become Katyushas, and as such is Iran's gift to the Palestinians of yet another setback.
Will Ahmadinejad become any less of a hero to these poor, downtrodden souls? Don't count on it.
But in any case, the 'Palestinian cause" has ceased to matter a long time ago. As for the larger strategic picture, Helprin makes a point that should ease the minds of everyone concerned with the fate of Western civilization:
To the Iranian de facto declaration to Israel, the Arabs, and the West that it possesses a belligerent outpost on the Mediterranean, Israel has weathered world condemnation to reply that the rent for this outpost is high and can be made higher. When Iran spoke to Israel in the language of war, Israel spoke back with absolute clarity even if not with the mythical brilliance attributed to it by friend and foe alike. Which is not to say that it is incapable of fighting the stunning existential battles that once it fought. For it is indeed capable of them, and they are yet to come.
Indeed they are. But whence came this "mythical brilliance attributed to [Israel] by friend and foe alike"?
With the same kind of intellectual lethargy that led to the obligatory description of the proposed international force as robust (I hope never to hear the word again), people who do not pretend to knowledge of either the Arab-Israeli conflict or military affairs habitually declare that Israel is invincible. Insensitive to fact, variation, potential orders of battle, or the effects of nuclear weapons, they have been saying this since the Six-Day War of 1967. That war, the 100-hour 1956 Sinai Campaign, and the 1976 Entebbe operation are responsible for expectations that Israel produces miracles every time it takes to the field.
These decisive victories were a surprise to many, who were shocked that the Jews, whom the Russian Empire's Cantonist Decrees of the 19th century had subjected to 25 years or more compulsory military service, had a military tradition and could hold their own in battle. And thus the swing of the pendulum from irrational contempt to irrational awe.
Irrational because even in 1967, in a war that borders on the miraculous perhaps more than any other, the struggles for Jerusalem and the Golan were hard fought, costly, and closely run. Irrational because for Israel the 1948 War of Independence dragged on with high casualties and much destruction, and left it with borders that were a strategical nightmare. Irrational because the War of Attrition spanned several difficult years and brought Israel no gains whatsoever. Irrational because in the 1973 War Israel came perilously close to extinction. And irrational because none of the campaigns in Lebanon has been anything but slow and bloody, and collectively they have given birth not to miracles but to the Hezbollah garrison that in this war Israel was compelled to reduce.
Then again, there is a clear difference between Victory, as in 1967 or 1991, and "Victory", as claimed by the Arabs who, sadly for them, and luckily for the rest of us, have never tasted the former (unless one counts Sir John Glubb's taking of East Jerusalem for them):
And yet Hezbollah is part of a people who claimed on the eve of the 1967 War that, "If the Sixth Fleet intervenes in our struggle…we have the power to turn it into a can of sardines"; who, as their armies were being slaughtered in Sinai, danced in the streets of Cairo; and who, after fleeing Kuneitra without a shot, called it the greatest military action in history, "even greater than the Russian defense of Stalingrad." Theirs is hardly a sober or disinterested assessment, and we have no reason to take them at their word.
In the end, what matters is not how these people feel about it, but what they have learned, and how, in their opinion, Israel can still be blackmailed, threatened, and coerced. And on this account, not all is lost:
Hezbollah has proved that it can survive an Israeli campaign of small scale and limited duration, but it has also proved that this can destroy Lebanon, and that 10,000 carefully accumulated "strategic" weapons—in the main, glorified artillery rounds—were during four weeks of engagement less potent than one suicide bomber.
Which, when you think about it, is pretty pathetic for any delusional end-of-days cult, especially one that seeks to bomb the world into submission.
(Read it all.)
Friday, September 01, 2006
Why We Love Mark Helprin (IV)
-- A Soldier of the Great War, X (La Rondine, p. 802)
The problem with war, as I have seen it, is not so much that it makes misery and grief - all of which would tend to come anyway, in time. The sin is in the abruptness, in the abridgement of those stages that otherwise might be joined so brilliantly to make a life.
Why We Love Mark Helprin (III)
-- A Soldier of the Great War, X (La Rondine, p. 799)
When I got back to Rome I discovered that the Italian Army considered me dead - in Gruensee, in the observation post, and on the Cima Bianca. That I was reported killed three times seemed not to affect their trust in the reports except to strengthen it. Being the army, they must have thought that anyone who was killed three times was most certainly deader than if he had been killed only once.
Why We Love Mark Helprin (II)
-- A Soldier of the Great War, VIII (The Winter Palace, p. 680)
Alessandro was excited beyond measure at the prospect of seeing sunlight on a tea cup, a family in the park, a beautiful girl walking down a staircase - those things for which all the great battles had been fought, and against which they paled.